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Abstract 
A health-risking illegal personal service is transacted when the expected extra 
satisfaction rate exceeds the ratio of the expected extra cost to the legal service price. 
Its prevalence decreases with the costs of risk bearing for the providers and clients. 
Law-enforcement effort lowers (raises) the equilibrium price of the illegal and 
hazardous service when the ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ degrees of absolute 
risk aversion is greater (smaller) than the ratio of the law-enforcement elasticities of 
their cost bearing.  
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1.  Introduction 
Due to the risk of contracting Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis C Virus 
and/or other blood-borne diseases, engagement in unprotected personal service 
without adequate medical information on own and partner’s health condition is similar 
to playing a Russian Roulette. For this reason, periodical tests of sex workers and the 
use of condom are mandatory in places where personal service is legal (for instance, 
in most of Australia’s states and territories). Anecdotic evidence suggests that despite 
the health and legal risk clients and sex-workers in these seemingly legal markets of 
personal service are engaged in unsafe exchange for obtaining greater stimulation and 
higher payment. The confidentiality of this exchange is a mutual interest for the client 
and the sex-worker and is highly secured by the intimate nature of the service and 
privacy rights.  
In view of the expected return and risk differentials between the safe and legal 
personal service (henceforth formal service) and the unsafe and illegal personal 
service (henceforth informal service) for clients and sex-workers, a mean-variance 
portfolio approach is proposed in this paper for analyzing the demand for, and the 
supply of, the informal service. The economic literature includes only a small number 
of studies of the personal-service industry. The most significant one is Moffatt’s 
(2004) assessment of the determinants of sex-workers’ service prices in the United 
Kingdom’s underground industry with hedonic price regression equation. The 
prevalence of double-type personal service in a seemingly single-type legal market 
and a portfolio approach for explaining clients and sex-workers’ choices of the 
personal service type have not yet been considered. A similar phenomenon, but in a 
non-commercial context, and a similar approach, but with a single representative 
agent rather than suppliers and clients, have been considered by Levy (2002) for 
explaining the prevalence of AIDS in a population of rational people.  
Sex-workers may have different physical attributes, personality and 
interpersonal skills. Naturally, the personal-service market is segmented by quality 
into sub-markets of fairly homogeneous group of sex-workers and their budget-wise 
matching group of clients. The structure of such a sub-market is outlined in section 2. 
The supply of, and demand for, the informal service in a sub-market are derived in 
sections 3 and 4, respectively. The equilibrium in a sub market is described in section 
5. The effects of the infection and legal risks on the informal-service market dynamics 
are discussed in section 6.  
The analysis leads to the following conclusions. The rate of the expected extra 
satisfaction from the informal service must be greater than the ratio of the informal 
service expected extra cost to the formal service price for the informal service to be 
transacted. The prevalence of the informal service decreases with the costs of risk 
bearing for the providers and the clients. As long as the law-enforcement effort is 
fixed, the costs of risk-bearing rise from one week to another between two 
consecutive tests due to increasing infection risk. The equilibrium price of the 
informal service rises with the service providers’ costs of risk bearing and falls with 
the clients’ costs of risk bearing. When  the ratio of the increase in the provider’s 
infection risk to the increase in the client’s infection risk is larger, equal to, or smaller 
than the ratio of their previous week’s overall risk and when law-enforcement effort is 
fixed, the current week’s price of the informal service is higher, equal to, or lower 
than its previous week’s price, respectively. When law-enforcement effort is 
responsive to prevalence, the individual clients and suppliers’ tendency to moderate 
their infection risks by concentrating the informal services in the early weeks of the 
period is counterbalanced by the legal risk stemming from a concerted law-
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enforcement effort. Spending on law enforcement effort lowers (raises) the 
equilibrium price of the informal service if the ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ 
degrees of absolute risk aversion is greater (smaller) than the ratio of the elasticities of 
their legal risks. 
 
2. Sub-market structure 
The clients and sex-workers in a sub-market incorporate into their decision-making 
process on the type of service the tradeoff between the expected return gains and the 
added costs of bearing health and legal risks stemming from the informal service. 
There are many small personal service providing agencies, and their operation is 
regulated and randomly inspected. The sex-workers are known, registered and 
periodically tested for sexually transmitted diseases. Formally, the sex-workers offer 
the legal safe service in a regulated fixed price. Informally, they solicit clients to have, 
or are induced by clients to provide, the more stimulating illegal unsafe service for an 
unreported (and hence untaxed) additional payment. The right of clients to see the 
sex-worker’s medical certificate helps eliminating those who are positively tested at 
the beginning of the period. Yet the personal-service market is porous. Unlike the sex- 
workers, clients are neither subjected to periodical medical tests, nor obliged to 
present a medical clearance. It is possible that externally invisible sexually transmitted 
diseases are carried by some clients. Sex-workers engaged in informal service with 
these clients might be infected and subsequently might transmit pathogenic viruses to 
other clients until their exclusion from the market by the next mandatory test. 
The analysis of the demand for the informal service in a personal-service sub-
market is based on the assumption that the clients are rational, risk averse and 
seemingly identical. A person showing symptoms of sexually transmitted disease 
cannot be a client – his demand for a formal, or informal, service is declined. 
Although the clients in a sub-market are seemingly identical, some of the clients carry 
sexually transmitted diseases. Due to lack of external symptoms they are not yet 
aware of their infection and rejected by the service providers. Consistently with 
cyclical needs and scheduling of personal activities, time is measured by weeks. Each 
client is perfectly informed about the weekly prices of the formal and informal 
services and decides on the numbers of these services for the week.  
The analysis of the supply of the informal service in a sub-market is based on 
the following assumptions. All intended providers are simultaneously tested for 
sexually transmitted diseases every T (a positive integer) weeks. The actual service 
providers are those tested negative. They are rational, risk averse, identical and fully 
employed — each providing a fixed number of equal duration services per week. 
Believing that, due to the existence of identical service providers, the clients do not 
use her services exclusively, each sex-worker regards all the clients as having equal 
probability of carrying sexually transmitted diseases. Since the real nature and price of 
her service are not observed by the patrons, each sex-worker makes her own decision 
on formal and informal services. Being identical, the sex-workers’ decisions on their 
expected-utility maximizing weekly combination of formal and informal services are 
uniform. Their optimal weekly combination is affected by the current prices and full 
costs of the formal service and the informal service.  
The full cost of the informal service includes the cost of bearing the risk of 
contracting diseases. The infection risk increases from one week to another during the 
T-week period between tests for the sex-workers and their clients. Furthermore, the 
costs of risk bearing for sex-workers and clients engaged in informal service rise with 
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the law-enforcement effort. Having been more intensively engaged in sexual activity, 
exposed to a larger number of partners, and more effectively targeted by law-
enforcers, the sex-workers’ gradients of the two types of risk are larger than those of 
the clients. Yet if endowed with a larger degree of risk aversion, a client’s cost of risk-
bearing might not be lower than that of a sex-worker.  
 
3.  Supply of the informal service 
The analysis of the weekly supply of the informal service is based on the following 
assumptions. The number of sex-workers in the personal-service sub-market during 
the T-week period between two consecutive tests is large – n. This number is also 
fixed as symptoms of sexually transmitted diseases do not become visible during the 
T-week period. The durations of formal and informal services are fixed and identical 
and hence the sum of the number of formal service ( SFN ) and the number of informal 
services ( SIFN ) offered by any sex-worker (who is assumed to be fully employed) 
during any given week ),1( Tt ∈  is fixed and known – N.  
 The sex-worker’s average variable cost of providing formal service is 
constant, Fc , and is mainly comprised of the agency’s patronage fee. Her cost of an 
informal service, IFc , is a normally distributed random variable with a time-invariant 
mean cµ  but with a weekly changing variance, )(
2 tcσ , that contains two components. 
The first component is the sex-worker’s infection risk, )(2 t
sH
σ . It reflects the sex-
worker’s risk of contracting a disease during an informal service and its implications 
for her future health, employment and income. The sex-worker’s infection risk rises 
with the number of weeks That have passed from the last test (i.e., 
),2()1()( 22 Tttt sHsH ∈∀−> σσ ). The second component, ))((
2 tgsσ , represents the 
sex-worker’s risk stemming from random inspection of the nature of her service. It is 
an increasing function of the spending on law-enforcement effort, g, during the week 
( 0/)(2 >dggd sσ ). The larger the spending on law-enforcement effort the higher the 
likelihood of inspection and adverse effects on an informal-service providing sex-
worker’s license and flow of future incomes. As these components are positive and 
additive, 
0))(()()( 222 >+= tgtt ssHc σσσ .        (1) 
 The price of the formal service ( FP ) is regulated and fixed. Due to the risk 
borne by the service providers, the price of the informal service ( IFP (t)) is higher than 
the price of the formal service. Since sex-workers are registered and it is a common 
knowledge that N services are given during a week by a fully employed sex-worker, 
every service is reported and a flat tax rate, 10 << τ , is applied. The informal 
services are falsely reported as formal services.  
 Summing up, a sex-worker’s weekly net profit ( )(tπ ) is normally distributed 
with 
)()]())([())(1())(( tNcPtPNcPtE SIFFcFIFFF −−−+−−= µτπ    (2) 
and  
222 )())](()([))(var( tNtgtt SIFssH σσπ += .      (3) 
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 The sex-worker’s weekly utility from her weekly net profit is negatively 
exponential with a unit upper-bound, reflecting a constant degree of absolute risk 
aversion 0>sR : 
))(exp(1 tRu s
s
t π−−= .          (4) 
 
Maximizing this weekly expected utility ( )))((exp(1 tRE sπ−− ) with respect to 
S
IFN  is 
equivalent to maximizing the power term in the moment-generating function of the 
sex-worker’s normally distributed weekly profit evaluated at sR− .
1  Namely, 
})())](()([5.0
)()]())([())(1{(max
222
)(
tNtgtR
tNcPtPNcP
S
IFssHs
S
IFFcFIFFF
tSIFN
σσ
µτ
+−
−−−+−−
 
Since 0))](()([ 22 >+ tgtR ssHs σσ , the second-order condition for maximum is 
satisfied and an interior solution exists as long as the price differential ))(( FIF PtP −  
exceeds the expected cost differential )( Fc c−µ . The necessary condition for 
maximum implies that any sex-worker’s weekly supply of informal service is:  
))](()([
)())((
)( 22 tgtR
cPtP
tN
ssHs
FcFIFS
IF σσ
µ
+
−−−
= .                              (5) 
Consequently, the aggregate weekly supply of the informal service ( )(tN sIF ) is given 
by 
 
))](()([
)]())([(
)( 22 tgtR
cPtPn
tN
ssHs
FcFIFs
IF σσ
µ
+
−−−
= .      (6) 
 
4.  Demand for the informal service 
The analysis of the weekly demand for the informal service is conducted within the 
following framework. The number of clients of the formal and informal services 
during a given week is large – )(tm . Some of the clients carry sexually transmitted 
diseases, but show no symptoms and are not aware of their condition. They are 
identical to the rest of the clients in any other respect. For each client, y  is the weekly 
fixed income, DFN  the number of formal services sought during the week, 
D
IFN   the 
number of  informal services sought during the week, Fr  the return on the risk-free 
formal service, and IFr  the normally distributed random return on the risky informal 
service with constant mean IFµ  and weekly variance )(
2 tIFσ .  
Since the informal service is more satisfying than the formal service, 
FIF r>µ . Let the scalar 0>α  be the rate of the expected satisfaction differential 
between the informal and formal services, then 
FIF r)1( αµ += .         (7) 
                                                 
1 See Freund (1956) for the development of this procedure and Hammond (1974) for a discussion of its 
generality. 
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 The variance of the return on the informal service represents the risk stemming 
from an unsafe service for the client’s health – the client’s infection-risk, 0)(2 >tdHσ . 
This risk rises with the number of weeks passed from the sex-workers’ last test (i.e., 
),2()1()( 22 Tttt dHdH ∈∀−> σσ ). The variance of the return on the informal service 
also reflects the client’s concerns about the inconvenience and loss of reputation 
accompanying a possible inspection by law-enforcers of the nature of the service, 
0))((2 >tgdσ  – an increasing function of the spending on law-enforcement effort 
during the week ( 0/))((2 >∂∂ gtgdσ ). In sum,  
0))(()()( 222 >+= tgtt ddHIF σσσ .       (8) 
 For simplicity, it is assumed that a fixed share, ε , of the client’s weekly 
income is spent on formal and informal services, and the client’s periodical utility 
from formal and informal services is independent of his utility from spending on other 
goods, ))1((ˆ yu d ε− .2 The client’s utility from his weekly personal services is given 
by a negative exponential function displaying a unit upper bound and a constant 
degree of absolute risk aversion, 0>dR . Hence, the client’s overall weekly utility is 
expressed as: 
)]}}()([exp{1{))1((ˆ tNrtNrRyuu DIFIF
D
FFd
dd
t +−−+−= ε .   (9) 
Since a fixed share of the client’s weekly income is spent on formal and informal 
services and the prices of the formal and informal services are exogenously given, the 
client’s number of formal services during the week is given by: 
)()( tN
P
P
y
P
tN DIF
F
IF
F
D
F −=
ε                   (10)         
and his weekly utility can be rewritten as: 
)]}())()(([exp{1))1((ˆ tNrtN
P
tP
P
yrRyuu DIFIF
D
IF
F
IF
F
Fd
dd
t +−−−+−=
εε .            (11) 
 The client chooses a weekly combination of numbers of formal services and 
informal services that maximizes his weekly expected utility. Recalling the definition 
of the moment-generating function and that IFr  is normally distributed, maximizing 
))(( ⋅duE  with respect to DIFN  is equivalent to maximizing 
222 )())](()([5.0)()1())(
)(
()( tNtgtRtNrtN
P
tP
P
yrtv DIFddHd
D
IFF
D
IF
F
IF
F
F σσα
ε
+−++−=         
                              .(12)   
Since 0))](()([ 22 >+ tgtR ddHd σσ , the second-order condition for maximum is 
satisfied and, as long as the relative expected return on the formal service ( α+1 ) 
exceeds the relative price ( FIF PtP /)( ), there exists an interior solution. Each client’s 
weekly demand for the illegal service is: 
                                                 
2 This assumption can be justified by habitual sexual activity. 
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))](()([
])(1[
)( 22 tgtR
r
P
tP
tN
ddHd
F
F
IF
D
IF σσ
α
+
−+
=                  (13) 
and the aggregate weekly demand for the informal service ( )(tN dIF ) is:  
))](()([
]
)(
1)[(
)( 22 tgtR
r
P
tP
tm
tN
ddHd
F
F
IF
d
IF σσ
α
+
−+
=  .                  (14) 
 
5. Informal-service equilibrium price and prevalence 
In view of the aggregate supply and demand equations (6) and (14), the informal 
service’s equilibrium price in week t is:  
))](()([))](()([)(
))](()([)())](()([)1)((
)(
2222
2222
*
tgtnRtgtR
P
r
tm
tgtRcPntgtRrtm
tP
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
IF
σσσσ
σσµσσα
+++
+−++++
=
                                 (15) 
and the prevalence of the informal service (i.e., the equilibrium number of informal 
services transacted) in week t is: 
))](()([))(/1())](()([)/1(
]/)[(
)( 2222
*
tgtRrtmtgtRnP
Pc
tN
ddHdFssHsF
FFc
IF σσσσ
µα
+++
−−
=        .(16)       
(See detailed derivation in the Appendix.) 
 
 COROLLARY 1: The informal service is traded if, and only if, the rate of the 
expected extra satisfaction from the informal service ( 1/ −= FIF rµα ) is greater than 
the ratio of the informal service’s expected extra cost to the formal service’s price 
( FFc Pc /)( −µ ).  
 
This corollary is straightforwardly obtained from equation (16). Its underlying 
rationale is as follows. From equation (14), the demand for the informal service is 
positive only when 
F
FIF
P
PP −
>
*
α .  From equation (6), the supply of the informal 
service is positive only when FcFIF cPP −>− µ
* . Consequently, if a positive quantity 
of the informal service is traded then it must be that .
*
F
c
F
FIF
P
c
P
PP −
>
−
>
µ
α  
Henceforth, it is assumed that .
F
c
P
c−
>
µ
α   
 The equilibrium in the informal-service market also reflects the following 
expected properties. 
 COROLLARY 2: The prevalence of the informal service decreases with the 
costs of risk bearing for the providers and the clients. (Straightforward from Eq. (16).)  
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 COROLLARY 3: The equilibrium price of the informal service rises with the 
service providers’ costs of risk bearing ( )]([ 22 gR ssHs
σσ + ) and decreases with the 
clients’ costs of risk bearing ( )]([ 22 gR ddHd σσ + ). (See Appendix for proof.) 
 
6. Informal-service market dynamics 
In view of the increase in the infection risk with the passage of time from the last test, 
there is an incentive for clients and providers to be more intensively engaged in 
informal services during the early phase of a period defined by two consecutive tests 
than in later weeks. In turn, there may be readiness for implementing relatively large 
law-enforcement effort in the early part of the period. The potentially high risk of 
service-disruption, loss of reputation for clients, and loss of employment and income 
for suppliers during the early phase may be taken into account by the service 
providers and clients. Common knowledge of these incentive and law-enforcement 
potential response moderates the concentration of informal services and, 
consequently, law-enforcement effort in the early phase.  
 In the special case of time-invariant law enforcement effort, the informal-
service market’s response to the rise in the infection risk between two consecutive 
tests can be displayed by a shift upward of the weekly aggregate supply curve and a 
shift downward of the weekly aggregate demand curve of the informal service. In 
agreement with corollaries 2 and 3, both shifts reduce the number of informal services 
transacted from one week to another but have opposite effects on the informal service 
price: the upward supply shift inflates the informal service price, whereas the 
downward demand shift deflates. This market dynamics is summarized by the 
following propositions. 
 
 PROPOSITION 1: If the law-enforcement effort is time-invariant, then the 
prevalence of the informal service declines from one week to another between two 
consecutive tests. (See Appendix for proof.) 
 
 PROPOSITION 2:  If the law-enforcement effort is time-invariant and the 
ratio of the current weekly rise in the provider’s infection risk to the current weekly 
rise in the client’s infection risk ( ]1()(/[)]1()([ 2222 −−−− tttt
dHdHsHsH
σσσσ ) is 
larger than, equal to, or smaller than, the ratio of their previous week’s overall risk 
( )]()1(/[)]()1([ 2222 gtgt ddHssH σσσσ +−+− ), then the current week’s price of the 
informal service is higher than, equal to, or lower than, the previous week’s price, 
respectively. (See Appendix for proof.) 
 
 Recalling Corollary 2 and that 0/)(2 >∂∂ ggsσ  and 0/)(
2 >∂∂ ggdσ , a rise in 
the spending on law-enforcement increases the costs of risk bearing for the informal 
service’s providers and clients and, in turn, lowers the prevalence of the informal 
service. The net effect of the additional spending on law-enforcement effort on the 
price of the informal service depends on the ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ 
degrees of absolute risk aversion and on the ratio of the providers’ and the clients’ 
elasticities of risk-bearing, which are defined (with the omission of the time index for 
convenience) as: 
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)]([
)/)((
)]([
)]}([{
22
2
22
22
g
ggg
gR
g
g
gR
ssH
s
ssHs
ssHs
s
σσ
σ
σσ
σσ
ξ
+
∂∂
=
+∂
+∂
≡               (17) 
and  
)]([
)/)((
)]([
)]}([{
22
2
22
22
g
ggg
gR
g
g
gR
ddH
d
ddHd
ddHd
d
σσ
σ
σσ
σσ
ξ
+
∂∂
=
+∂
+∂
≡ .            (18) 
 
 PROPOSITION 3: If 
d
s
d
s
R
R
>
ξ
ξ
, then the price of the informal service rises 
with law-enforcement effort. If  
d
s
d
s
R
R
<
ξ
ξ
, then the price of the informal service falls 
with law-enforcement effort. (See proof in the Appendix.) 
 
 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
The behavior of rational providers and clients in an apparently legal personal-service 
market, where a health-risking service is illegally traded alongside a safe and legal 
alternative, was analyzed. The analysis assessed the effects of the costs of the risk 
borne by expected-utility-maximizing providers and clients on the informal service 
equilibrium price and prevalence and their dynamics. The development and 
introduction of medical tests that provide instantaneous result and can be 
inexpensively and mutually applied by the service providers and their clients before 
engagement in unprotected personal service will eliminate the risk of contracting 
diseases for the participants in the personal service market and for the general public, 
increase the clients’, providers’ and public welfare, and facilitates the transformation 
of the currently hazardous service to non-hazardous one. 
 10
References 
Freund, R.J. (1956), “An Introduction of Risk into a Risk Programming Model”, 
Econometrica 24, 253-263. 
 
Hammond, S. (1974), “Simplification of Choice under Uncertainty”, Management 
Science 20, 1047-1072. 
 
Levy, A., 2002, “A Lifetime Portfolio of Risky and Risk-Free Sexual Behaviour and 
the Prevalence of AIDS”, Journal of Health Economics 21 (6), pp. 993-1007. 
 
Moffatt, P. G and Peters, S. A. (November 2004), “Pricing Personal Services: An 
Empirical Study of Earnings in the UK Prostitution Industry”, Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy  51 (5), pp. 675-690. 
 
 
 11
APPENDIX 
The informal service equilibrium price and prevalence: From equation (6) and 
(14), the informal service market-clearing condition is 
)]([
)]()[(
)]([
)1(
22
*
22
*
gR
cPPn
gR
r
P
P
m
ssHs
FcFIF
ddHd
F
F
IF
σσ
µ
σσ
α
+
−−−
=
+
−+
                  (A.1)             
which implies that the informal service equilibrium price is  
)]([)]([
)]([)()]([)1(
2222
2222
*
gnRgR
P
rm
gRcPngRrm
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
IF
σσσσ
σσµσσα
+++
+−++++
= .       (A.2) 
Equation (14) also implies 
d
IF
F
ddHdF
FIF Nmr
gRP
PP
)]([
)1(
22
* σσα
+
−+= .        (A.3) 
Equation (6) implies, 
s
IF
ssHs
FcFIF Nn
gR
cPP
)]([ 22* σσµ
+
+−+= .       (A.4) 
In equilibrium, 
*
22
*
22 )]([)]([
)1( IF
ssHs
FcFIF
F
ddHdF
F Nn
gR
cPN
mr
gRP
P
σσ
µ
σσ
α
+
+−+=
+
−+  
            (A.5) 
implying 
)]([)/1()]([)/1(
/)(
2222
*
gRmrgRnP
Pc
N
ddHdFssHsF
FFc
IF σσσσ
µα
+++
−−
= .                     (A.6) 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 3: By differentiating equation (15) with respect to the provider’s 
cost of risk bearing, 
 
22222
22
22222
2222
22222
2222
22
*
)]}([)]([{
)]([]/)([
)]}([)]([{
)]}([)()]([)1({
)]}([)]([{
)]}([)]([{)1(
)]([
gnRgR
P
rm
gRmnrPc
gnRgR
P
r
m
gRcPngRrm
P
r
m
gnRgR
P
rm
gnRgR
P
rmrm
gR
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFFFc
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
F
F
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdssHs
F
F
F
ssHs
IF
σσσσ
σσµα
σσσσ
σσµσσα
σσσσ
σσσσα
σσ
+++
+−−
=
+++
+−++++
−
+++
++++
=
+∂
∂
  
                  .(A.7) 
Recalling corollary 1,  
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0
)]}([)]([{
)]([]/)([
)]([ 22222
22
22
*
>
+++
+−−
=
+∂
∂
gnRgR
P
rm
gRmnrPc
gR
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFFFc
ssHs
IF
σσσσ
σσµα
σσ
.         (A.8)   
 
By differentiating equation (15) with respect to the client’s cost of risk bearing, 
22222
22
22222
22
22222
2222
22222
2222
22
*
)]}([)]([{
)]([]/)([
)]}([)]([{
)]([)]1(/)[(
)]}([)]([{
)]}([)()]([)1({
)]}([)]([{
)]}([)]([){(
)]([
gnRgR
P
rm
gRmnrPc
gnRgR
P
rm
gRnmrPcP
gnRgR
P
rm
gRcPngRrmn
gnRgR
P
rm
gnRgR
P
rmcPn
gR
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ssHsFFFc
ddHdssHs
F
F
ssHsFFFcF
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdFcFssHsF
ddHdssHs
F
F
ddHdssHs
F
F
FcF
ddHd
IF
σσσσ
σσµα
σσσσ
σσαµ
σσσσ
σσµσσα
σσσσ
σσσσµ
σσ
+++
+−−
−=
+++
++−−+
=
+++
+−++++
−
+++
+++−+
=
+∂
∂
                  .(A.9) 
Recalling corollary 1, 
0
)]}([)]([{
)]([]/)([
)]([ 22222
22
22
*
<
+++
+−−
−=
+∂
∂
gnRgR
P
rm
gRmnrPc
gR
P
ddHdssHs
F
F
ssHsFFFc
ddHd
IF
σσσσ
σσµα
σσ
.   (A.10) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Since )(2 gsσ  and )(
2 gdσ  are fixed and 
)1()( 22 −> tt
sHsH
σσ and ),2()1()( 22 Tttt dHdH ∈∀−> σσ , the providers’ and clients’ 
costs of risk bearing increase from one week to another between two consecutive 
tests.  As can be seen from Eq. (16), the prevalence of the informal service decreases 
with the costs of risk bearing for the providers and the clients.  
 
Proof of proposition 2: 
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Recalling Corollary 3 (i.e., Eq. (A8) and Eq. (A10)), 
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Recalling Corollary 1, 222222* )]([)]([0
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equivalently, 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
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and in recalling Corollary 3 (i.e., Eq. (A.8) and Eq. (A.10), 
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As the denominator of this expression is positive, and as FFc Pc /)( −> µα  
(Corollary 1), 0
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By rearranging terms and recalling equations (17) and (18), these conditions can be 
equivalently expressed as displayed in the proposition. 
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